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Introduction 
‘’Protecting space for civil society and citizenry is particularly critical in a world marked by rising 
political and economic inequality.’’-Winnie Byanyima 
 
Civil society has been a subject of studies of many philosophers for ages. Many authors 
define it as a part of human nature, others look at it from the cultural and social perspectives and 
there are some philosophers who view it as a part of governance and politics. In general terms, 
this means that civil society has had a big role in the social, cultural, economic and political life of 
people even centuries ago. 
Though society went through the process of civilization and changed a lot during the time, 
the conception of civil society remains the same and it involves all aspects of people’s lives. It is 
to ensure the commonwealth of all the society members. Civil society does not have a single 
domain, but it evolves social, cultural, economic and political spheres and contributes to the 
development of individuals, communities, and states. However, alongside its development civil 
society also encounters challenges and repression from state and nonstate parties who try to 
reduce the political or civic space where they operate. The CIVICUS defines civic space as “the 
respect in policy and practice for the freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression” 
(CIVICUS 2018, 1). Those are the fundamental freedoms, which each state has as an obligation 
to protect and ensure the full enjoyment of them by people. 
Within the increasing popularity of civil society and its influence on policies and 
governments in recent years, the trend of repression of civil society organisations is striking. 
Governments create legal and administrative barriers to make it more difficult for civil society 
organisations to operate. This phenomenon is commonly called “Shrinking Space,” which, 
according to the many civil society experts, is defined as a framework or a concept capturing “a 
dynamic relationship between repressive methods and political struggle” (Hayes et al. 2017, 3). 
The main value of this framework is to understand the common trends of repression. 
This research aims to analyse the magnitude of impact of the civil society score in the 
overall democracy index. It introduces a new methodology for calculation of shrinking space 
growth index in the Eastern Partnership countries. Moreover, it identifies the repressive measure 
imposed on civil society by the government of the six Eastern Partnership countries:  
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The research indicates three major hypotheses: 
H1: Level of democracy depends on the level of development and independence of civil 
society; 
H2: The high civil society score in the democracy index does not guarantee low shrinking 
space score; 
H3: The repressive measures depend on the level of the democracy in the countries.  
 
The methodological approach taken combines a comprehensive secondary analysis of 
existing quantitative and qualitative data on the issue of shrinking space and expert consultations 
with the civil society representatives working on the topic.  
The secondary analysis included previous research, publications, articles, literature as well 
as democracy and civil society indices. The peer review/expert consultation has involved 
experts/civil society representatives in Europe who have extensive knowledge and experience 
working on the topic in the region. The Democracy score has been analysed through simple linear 
regression to predict the level of impact of civil society in democracy. Moreover, the Shrinking 
Space score and Shrinking Space Growth Index have been developed using the data of the 
Eastern Partnership Index for 2015–2016 and 2017. As a sample for assessments of democracy 
level and civic space, Eastern Partnership countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Moldova, and Ukraine) have been taken. The sample has been chosen considering the diversity 
and dynamics of democratic changes (improvements and deteriorations) in the region. 
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A. Civil Society in the Context of Democratisation  
In general, civil society is perceived as the crucial source for transiting to democracy and 
developed civil society serves as an indicator for a high level of democracy. Schmitter and Karl 
focus on the characteristics of democracy, value the importance of civil society in the processes 
of democratisation. Talking about regime changes Schmitter and Karl define it as a process of 
liberalization that triggers “the resurrection or formation of organisations within civil society” (1991, 
270–284). The development of civil society in this conception of democracy is seen as a result of 
the push from the state. Generally, the state is the main actor in paving the way for civil society to 
function and influence democratic developments. However, there is also an opposing conception 
of the role of civil society in democratisation. For instance, John S. Dryzek in his “Political Inclusion 
and the Dynamics of Democratization” article addresses the importance of political inclusion and 
as an important factor for democratisation considers the push from civil society by stating that 
“oppositional civil society may be a better focus for democratization than is the state” (1996, 475).  
Portugal and Spain have been the first countries where in the 1970s a wave of 
democratisation has started, which later developed in the whole world in the next twenty years. 
The so called “Third Wave” (Huntington 1991) took over the countries of Eastern Europe and 
Latin America. Afterwards, it moved across the countries in Asia and Africa. In 1974, the nature 
of political regimes dramatically changed, as 41 out of 150 states were democratised, whereas, in 
2006, 123 out of 192 states were considered “electoral democracies” despite their imperfect 
character (Diamond 2006, 21).  
Despite the worthwhile changes during that the third wave of democratisation has brought 
into the political structures in the progressing world, it is crucial to remember that democratisation 
is not undeviating. Only a few countries have been able to smoothly transit into democracy and 
establish consolidated and functioning democratic regimes. Therefore, most of the new regimes 
have not been able to overcome the transition phase and were stuck in transition or fell back in 
relatively authoritarian regimes. Different authors have different conceptions about these 
emergent democracies. In his ''The rise of illiberal democracy'' Fareed Zakaria (1997) calls those 
regimes “illiberal” democracies, whereas in the conception of O'Donnell they are called 
“delegative”, however; more generally are considered “hybrid” regimes. The American 
researcher, Marina Ottaway in her “Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism” 
publication defines the hybrid regimes as systems, which combine acceptance of liberal 
democracy and existence of formal democratic structures. In terms of civil society and human 
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rights, Ottaway defines hybrid regimes as political regimes where civil and political liberties are 
limited with extremely illiberal or authoritarian traits (2003, 3).  
The democratisation process of post-Soviet countries has been quite a challenge in 
considering the socio-political and economic situation after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 
transition from an authoritarian regime to a more liberal has been with some ups and downs. Some 
of the reports show that post-Soviet countries are still in the transition process and are not fully 
democratised.  
The European Union has been showing shows particular interest in democratisation 
throughout Europe and neighbouring countries, including post-Soviet countries, aiming to build a 
common area of shared democracy, prosperity, stability and increased cooperation with Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine through multilateral and bilateral 
cooperation within the framework of Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative of European 
Neighbourhood Policy. Additionally, it helps to strengthen state and societal resilience to make 
EaP countries to deal with internal and external challenges. Different indices are being developed 
annually which reflects the changes (improvement and deterioration) in the countries based on 
various categories.  
The Economist’s Democracy Index provides ratings based on five categories: electoral 
process and pluralism, civil liberties, functioning of government, political participation, and political 
culture (The Economist 2019, 47). Whereas, Freedom House's democracy score (DS) provides 
numerical ratings on seven indicators which besides Civil Society (CS) also includes indicators of 
National Democratic Governance (NDG), Electoral Process (EP), Independent Media (IM), Local 
Democratic Governance (LDG), Judicial Framework and Independence (JFI), and Corruption 
(CO). With the Civil Society indicator the Freedom House assesses the development, capacity, 
and financial sustainability of nongovernmental organisations as well as the legal and political 
environment in which they operate. Alongside, it assesses the development of independent trade 
unions, civil society participation in the policy-making, and the level of threat posed by 
antidemocratic extremists in society (Freedom in the World 2019). 
Diagram 1 indicates the CS score for six EaP countries in 2009–2018. The results show 
that the dynamics of developments in the civil society in Armenia and Georgia have not changed 
significantly as both of the countries within the last ten years (2009–2018) have obtained the same 
score. Interestingly, with the same CS score, Georgia is classified as a hybrid regime, whereas, 
Armenia is considered semi-consolidated authoritarian. This means that the civil society score 
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has not had a significant impact on the determination of regime type in those cases. However, it 
does not mean that further changes in the CS scores do not affect the final democracy score and 
consequently on regime type.  
 
Source: Freedom House. The ratings are based on a scale of 1 (highest) to 7 (lowest) for the category of Civil Society in 
the democracy score. 
 
The results also show that despite the reinforcement of civil society and investments 
brought to the region by the Eastern Partnership initiative the civil society score of Azerbaijan has 
significantly regressed. Moreover, Moldova has progressed and sustained since 2009. The scores 
of Ukraine and Belarus have changed in some years (Ukraine with progressing, Belarus with 
regressing), however, in 2018 they both stand at the same place as in 2009.  
When observing the indices, it is important to look at the data of each category to see the 
level of influence of each category in the final democracy score. Table 1 below shows the score 
of each indicator for six EaP countries. In order to measure the impact of civil society score on the 
final democracy score, the indicators are analysed separately. 
Table 1: Freedom House’s Nations in Transit Democracy Scores of Eastern Partnership 
Countries in 2018 by Categories. 
 NDG EP CS IM LDG JFI CO DS Regime Type 
Ukraine 5,75 3,50 2,75 4,25 4,75 5,75 5,75 4,64 Hybrid 
Georgia 5,50 4,50 3,75 4,25 5,25 5,00 4,50 4,68 Hybrid 
Moldova 5,75 4,00 3,25 5,00 5,50 5,00 6,00 4,93 Hybrid 
Armenia 6,00 6,00 
 
3,75 
 
5,50 
 
5,75 
 
5,50 
 
5,50 
 
5,43 
 
Semi-Consolidated 
Authoritarian 
Belarus 6,75 6,75 6,25 6,75 6,75 7,00 6,00 6,61 Consolidated 
Authoritarian 
Azerbaijan 7,00 7,00 7,00 7,00 6,50 7,00 7,00 6,93 Consolidated 
Authoritarian 
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
4.50
5.00
5.50
6.00
6.50
7.00
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Diagram 1. The ratings of Civil Society Subategory in Democratic Score of 
EAP countries in 2009-2018.
Ukraine
Armenia
Azerbeijan
Belarus
Moldova
Georgia
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Thus, to predict the dependent variable values (α) as a function of the independent 
variables, a simple linear regression model has been used, where the independent variable (y) is 
Civil Society Indicator and dependent variable (x) is the Democracy Score1. The following model 
function has been used: 
𝒙 = 𝜶 × 𝜸 +  𝜷 
Construction of a regression model aims at revealing the magnitude of impact of Civic 
Society Score on the overall Democracy Score given the data. Table 2 below shows the regression 
model encompassing the Civil Society Score and Democracy Score calculated for the six EaP 
countries is statistically significant (Asymp. Sig < 0.05) and goodness-of-fit measure for linear 
regression model is high (R square =,895). The α value of civil society indicator in the overall 
democracy score is 0.486, which means if the civil society score changes with 1 unit (regress or 
progress) the democracy score will be changed with 0.486.  
 
Diagram 22 shows the value of each indicator in the overall democracy score. The simple 
linear regression for each independent variable shows that the most value in the democracy score 
have NDG (1.732), JFI (1.295), and LDG (1.29), whereas CS, EP, IM, and CO indicators have the 
least influence on democracy score respectively with 0.486, 0.565, 0,796, and 0.877 points. 
 
1 While interpreting data it should be taken into consideration that Democracy Score has been calculated based on Civil 
Society Indicator, therefore, Democracy Score has been cleaned from the corresponding variable during each simple 
linear regression. 
2 Data has been collected using the outputs (see Annex 1) of simple linear regression for each indicator.  
Table 2: Civil Society Value in the Democracy Score. 
Equation 
Model Summary Parameter Estimates 
R Square F df1 df2 Sig. Constant b1 
Linear ,895 33,949 1 4 ,004 3,543 ,486 
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Due to the methodological approach and scaling (7-lowest and 1-highest) taken by 
Freedom House, the value of the categories with relatively better categories is not very high. 
However, the significant impact of civil society on democratic development is evitable as if the 
indicator changes even with 1-unit democracy score will also change, consequently resulting 
change in the regime type for some of the countries. For example, if the democracy score for 
Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova increases with 0,486 (meaning the CS score is worsening with 1 
unit) it means that all three countries will be classified as semi-consolidated democracies. Thus, 
the hypothesis that the democracy level depends on the development of civil society is proved 
because even small changes in the civil society score will result in changes in the overall 
democracy score and consequently, changes in the regime types.  
As it is already stated, civil society space narrows as governments approach to the civil 
society as a threat to their authority, thus it has a direct connection to the political activities of civil 
society organisations. 
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B. Civic Space in the Eastern Partnership countries: Shrinking or expanding? 
1. Shrinking Space Growth Index in Eastern Partnership Countries 
Within the framework of the Eastern Partnership initiative, numerous significant outcomes 
have been witnessed, in terms of good governance in some EaP countries. Particularly, hundreds 
of civil society organisations have been supported financially as well as in terms of capacity 
building. Despite the reinforcement of democratic values and democratic society in the region, the 
civil society space is challenged also in Eastern Partnership countries. Yet, the repression on civil 
society varies from country to country and should be observed, in terms of the level of democracy 
and political regimes. On the one hand, there is Azerbaijan and Belarus which are considered 
authoritarian countries, on the other hand, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, which are 
classified as hybrid regimes. Despite the level of democratisation, civil society organisations in all 
six Eastern Partnership countries are experiencing repression and still need to improve the 
livelihood of the society and protect fundamental human rights, political rights, and civil liberties.  
As the Table 3 indicates, in terms of all five subcategories of deep and sustainable 
democracy indicator of the EaP Index, Azerbaijan and Belarus have the lowest scores and it 
shows that fundamental rights are not respected in those countries. Armenia has medium scores 
in all categories (reporting period is 2017), Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova are in the lead, 
however, in terms of human rights and protection against torture, Ukraine falls behind Georgia. 
The ratings of these categories reflect the situation of civil society in the countries and show that 
the issue of civic space is relevant in the EAP countries.  
In order to analyse the civil society situation in the EaP countries and find out the level of 
civil society growth in the period of 2015 to 2017, a Shrinking Space Score has been generated 
Table 3. Scores of Five Subcategories of Deep and Sustainable Democracy Dimension 
of EaP Index in 2017. 
 
 
Country Freedom of 
Speech and 
Assembly 
Human 
Rights, 
Protection 
against 
Torture 
Democratic 
Rights and 
Elections 
Independent 
Media 
Equal 
opportunities and 
non-
discrimination 
Armenia 0,47 0,58 0,48 0,55 0,48 
Azerbaijan 0 0,36 0,16 0,13 0,44 
Belarus 0,1 0,06 0,18 0,21 0,25 
Georgia 0,73 0,68 0,7 0,62 0,64 
Moldova 0,72 0,64 0,61 0,61 0,68 
Ukraine 0,83 0,65 0,7 0,57 0,75 
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based on the following five variables of the EaP Index, which reflect the civil society situation: 
Freedom of Speech and Assembly, Human Rights, Protection against Torture, Democratic Rights 
and Elections, Independent Media, Equal opportunities and non-discrimination. Thus, the 
following equation has been used to calculate the Shrinking Space Score:  
𝐲𝐢
𝟎 =
∑ 𝐱𝐣 
𝟎
𝒌
𝒋=𝟏
𝐤
 
Where k is the number of variables (5), i is the number of observations (6). As the baseline 
of the calculation of the index, the data of the 2015–2016 Eastern Partnership Index has been 
used. The same formula has been used to calculate the Shrinking Space Score for 2017.  The 
highest value (j) of the index equals 1 and the Shrinking Space Score is equal to (1–Xi.). As results 
show, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova have the lowest Shrinking Space score in both reporting 
periods (2015–2017). However, a difference between scores in 2015–2016 and 2017 can be 
observed. Thus, in order to generate an Index of Shrinking Space Growth (SSGI), the following 
formula has been used: 
𝐒𝐒𝐆𝐈 =
𝐲𝟏
𝐲𝟎
 
y1 is the Shrinking Space Score for the reporting period of 2017 and y0 reflects the score 
in 2015–2016. Thus, as the results indicated in Table 3 show, despite having the highest positions 
in all five categories in both reporting periods, a tendency of regression in terms of civic space is 
observed in Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova as for 2017. In Moldova, the Index of Shrinking Space 
Growth is the highest (1.17), meaning that seventeen percent regression has been recorded. 
Ukraine has the second highest score (1.07) followed by Georgia (1.06), which means that the 
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percentage of regression in these countries is respectively seven and six3. Moreover, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Belarus have recorded slight changes in comparison with the results of the 2015–
2016 reporting period by improving their score approximately with two – three percent. 
However, it does not mean that those countries have better conditions for civil society than 
the ones where the phenomenon of shrinking space has been recorded.  
 
The analysis comes to prove the hypothesis that the issue of shrinking space is relevant 
for both more democratized countries and authoritarian regimes. The generation of the Shrinking 
Space Growth Index shows that the countries with higher civil society scores such as Georgia, 
Ukraine, and Moldova have higher shrinking space score, whereas authoritarian countries in this 
case Azerbaijan and Belarus have recorded decrease in the shrinking space score despite having 
lower civil society scores. This comes to prove the hypothesis that the high civil society score does 
not guarantee lower shrinking space growth index. It should be noted that this does not mean that 
the civic space is much larger in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus than other countries, the index 
 
3 The percentage of the SSGI is counted through the (SSGI–1) × 100 equation. 
4 The scores have been calculated based on the data of the Eastern Partnership Index. It mirrors the results of the five 
categories of the index (see Annex 2). For example, the score for Armenia in the dimension of Human Rights, 
protection against Torture is 0.58, thus shrinking space score of that dimension equals 0.42. 
 Table 3: Shrinking Space Growth Index 20174 
 
 
 
Years 
Freedom 
of 
Speech 
and 
Assembl
y 
Human 
Rights, 
Protectio
n against 
Torture 
Democrati
c Rights 
and 
Elections 
Independen
t Media 
 
Equal 
opportunitie
s and non-
discriminatio
n 
 
Shrinking 
Space 
Score 
 
 
SSGI 
Armenia  
2017 0,53 0,42 0,52 0,45 0,52 0,48 0,97 
2015-2016 0,54 0,36 0,57 0,47 0,53 0,49 
Azerbaijan  
2017 1 0,64 0,84 0,87 0,56 0,78 0,98 
2015-2016 1 0,67 0,94 0,77 0,59 0,79 
Belarus  
2017 0,9 0,94 0,82 0,79 0,75 0,84 0,98 
2015-2016 1 0,95 0,85 0,78 0,69 0,85 
Georgia  
2017 0,27 0,32 0,3 0,38 0,36 0,32 1,06 
2015-2016 0,28 0,28 0,32 0,31 0,32 0,3 
Moldova  
2017 0,28 0,36 0,39 0,39 0,32 0,34 1,17 
2015-2016 0,3 0,3 0,28 0,36 0,21 0,29 
Ukraine  
2017 0,17 0,35 0,3 0,43 0,25 0,3 1,07 
2015-2016 0,17 0,23 0,41 0,37 0,25 0,28 
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shows that in terms of changes in the civic space there are slight improvements in those countries 
and deteriorations in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine since 2015.   
2. Demonstration of Prescriptive and Reflexive Measures of Repression 
  
As the data and CIVICUS Monitor’s ratings show the phenomenon of shrinking space is a 
worldwide issue and concerns not only to authoritarian regimes but also involves democratic 
countries. Thus, the democratisation process in the world is under risk and there is a tendency of 
regression in terms of reinforcement of democratic development, human rights protection and 
independence of civil society and media.  
Diagram 3 below illustrates the image of the most common violations of civic space 
worldwide since 2016. According to the CIVICUS Monitor’s data attacks on journalists, censorship, 
and harassment of civil society actors are the top three violations reported in recent years.5 The 
list also depicts the use of excessive force, detention, intimidation, disruption and prevention 
of protests as well as restrictions by law. 
 
The violations of civic space and repression on civil society are not only limited by above 
mentioned measures but also involve more various tactics that are possessed on civil society 
worldwide. Despite the same notion of the phenomenon, the measures of repression vary from 
 
5Source: Data is based on an analysis of 1,433 civic space updates published on the CIVICUS Monitor since 24 
October 2016. The numbers above represent the number of times this violation was referenced in one report.  
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country to country. Some repressive measures can be relevant to one country and irrelevant to 
others.  
According to CIVICUS Monitor, the Eastern Partnership countries, in terms of civic space 
situation have been categorised into four different groups. None of the countries have open civic 
space, however Georgia has a “favourable” position and is categorised as “narrowed,” whereas 
Armenia, Ukraine, and Moldova are in the “obstructed” category. Civic space in Belarus is 
considered “repressed” and in Azerbaijan as “closed” (CIVICUS 2019). As the analysis of 
Freedom House’s Democracy Index showed, Ukraine and Moldova have higher civil society rating 
(respectively 2.75 and 3.25), whereas Armenia and Georgia equally have 3.75 points. This comes 
to prove that the indicators and indices do not fully reflect on reality and are estimations. Thus, in 
order to understand the civil space issue more broadly, it is crucial to analyse the demonstration 
of prescriptive and reflexive measures in the EaP countries.  
As the research showed legislation and regulations are being introduced which creates 
barriers to the registration of civil society organisations. This trend exists also in some of the 
EaP countries, namely Azerbaijan and Belarus have strict legislation regarding registration, 
reporting and overall operation of CSOs. Belarus is not a part of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, instead, it has joined the International 
Covenant for Civil and Political Rights; however, the freedom of association (Article 22) of the 
Covenant has been violated multiple times in recent years. As the CIVICUS Monitor reports, 
several organisations focusing on education, youth, gender, and human rights have been refused 
to be registered in Belarus in 2016. For example, the registration of “Center for Gender Studies 
Ruza” has been rejected with the justification that gender equality is already guaranteed by the 
state and it beyond the competence of the association. Consequently, some Belarusian 
organisation facing difficulties in registration, register abroad, particularly in Lithuania, Poland, 
Czech Republic and other countries (Activists 2016). The prescriptive measures set by the 
government narrow down the civic space in Belarus and limit the operations of the local 
organisations. Moreover, the rejections of registration for organisations focusing on sensitive 
issues (gender equality, human rights, etc.) show that the state has a certain approach and criteria 
when it comes to the registration. It pressures the organisations working on topics and directions 
which potentially can challenge their authority. Thus, with nonregistration of the organisations, the 
state eliminates all the chances of the individuals to enjoy their freedom of association, as the laws 
in Belarus also prohibit operations of unregistered associations and administrative 
responsibilities/financial penalties are established for their operation.  
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Unlike in Belarus, the NGO Law of Azerbaijan permits the establishment of informal and 
unregistered organisations and generally does not restrict operations of local unregistered 
organisations. However, the operation of unregistered foreign organisations is prohibited. 
Additionally, financial penalties are set for organisations not complying with the legislation (Civic 
Freedom Monitor: Azerbaijan 2019).  
Besides the restrictions on registration, both in Azerbaijan and Belarus, operational 
barriers are put against the NGOs. The laws allow the authorities to supervise organisations and 
to issue warning letters. Moreover, in the regions the CSOs have to get the approval of the regional 
authorities to conduct their events; nevertheless, such requirements do not have a legal 
background. In Azerbaijan, the Ministry of Justice possesses the right to inspect the activity of 
local organisations as well as foreign NGOs with registered offices in Azerbaijan. This is a concern, 
as the state has been given broad powers to interfere in the internal activities of the CSOs. The 
largest scale persecution of local and international organisations has been recorded in May 2014 
when dozens CSOs have been subjected to different types of pressures including seizure of  bank 
accounts, interrogation of CSOs leaders and staff members, tax inspections and heavy penalties,  
arrests and conviction of leaders of human rights organisations, discriminatory documentary and 
physical checks of NGO leaders and staff members at the borders, prohibition of civil society 
members’ travels, and shutting down of local and international organisations (Ismayil and 
Remezaite 2016, 19).  
Interference in the internal affairs of the organisations is common practice also in Belarus, 
despite the fact that the law on Public Associations defines prohibition for the interference of the 
authorities and officials in the activity of public associations. Nevertheless, the state bodies 
interfere in the organisations’ internal affairs even in the stage of registration by changing the aims, 
tasks, methods of activities, and the structure. Broad grounds for suspension and liquidation have 
been established by law in case of noncompliance with the requirements of the registering 
authorities (Civic Freedom Monitor: Belarus 2019). 
In addition to other operational barriers, Belarusian and Azerbaijani legislation also 
restricts access to funding for CSOs and challenge their activities. Noncompliance with the 
legislation and violation of the procedure of receiving foreign grants in some cases brings the 
CSOs to criminal responsibility. In Belarus (Civic Freedom Monitor: Belarus 2019) and Azerbaijan 
(Civic Freedom Monitor: Azerbaijan 2019), CSOs are required to register grant agreements, which 
complicates international funding and leads to a governmental crosscheck. The President’s 
Decree on Foreign Gratuitous Aid defines that foreign funding in Belarus has to be registered and 
 15 
 
assessed by the Department for Humanitarian Activities6, which decides whether or not the 
funding request should be approved (Decree 2015). With the legislation, the authorities are 
controlling the foreign funding and there is no guarantee that the decisions made by the state 
bodies are fair and do not aim to shut down particular organisations. The Decree also indicates 
the cases when foreign funding is declined. According to it, the funding for political campaigns and 
seminars, extremist activities and other political propaganda work with the public is prohibited. 
With these kinds of vague statements, the authorities get a larger opportunity to label any funding 
as political and impose restrictions.  However, some of the definitions of prohibitions are not very 
specific which is concerning as it gives more opportunities to the state to implement legal acts 
subjectively and arbitrarily. For example, a local human rights organisation “Viasna” was refused 
registration multiple times, moreover, its staff was subjected to intimidation and harassment (Civic 
Freedom Monitor: Belarus 2019).   
In Azerbaijan, not only local CSOs but also donour organisations are obliged to obtain 
permission from authorities to be able to provide or implement a grant project. Moreover, the CSOs 
which receive grants have to obtain registration for a grant agreement. In order to determine if 
donour organisation can give grants in Azerbaijani NGOs, an assessment by the Ministry of 
Finance “on financial and economic reasonability of such a grant is required” (Ismayil and 
Remezaite 2016, 12). 
Generally, the freedom of association is respected in other EaP countries in terms of legal 
regulation. However, there are still procedures that create hindrances for CSOs and are 
concerning. In Moldova, the procedure of opening bank accounts has been changed in 2016 and 
for some CSOs it caused difficulties, consequently negatively affecting their ability to get 
international funds.  Moreover, despite the open and supportive legal framework for civil society, 
the CSOs are required to open bank accounts only in state banks. This means that the state can 
openly have access to their accounts (CIVICUS Monitor 2019).   
In the cases of Armenia, Georgia, and Ukraine, the organisations mostly enjoy their right to 
association; however the right occasionally is breached by other actors, especially when it comes 
to the organisations working with sensitive topics such as LGBT issues. The groups working on 
LGBT issues receive threats and even experience violent attacks. For example, in 2016, the office 
of “Identoba” (an NGO working on LGBT issues in Georgia) was set on fire and the investigations 
failed to hold anyone accountable for it (CIVICUS Monitor 2019). On the one hand, the 
 
6Department for Humanitarian Activities is at the President’s Office of the Republic of Belarus.  
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organisations working on sensitive topics and not having public support have difficulties to enjoy 
their right to association as the state fails to protect their fundamental freedoms guaranteed by 
international standards and reinforcement in the national laws. On the other hand, the lack of 
acceptance and trust of the wider public towards these organisations contribute to the repression 
also from the governments who do not want to lose their popularity among the public by showing 
support to the vulnerable groups such as the LGBT community.  
Besides the violation of freedom of association, other freedoms are also breached for the 
civil society in the Eastern Partnership countries. In particular, violations of freedom of 
expression and freedom of assembly are reported in all six countries to some extent.  
A series of repressive legislative amendments have been made by Azerbaijan's National 
Assembly back in 2013, which established barriers for not only freedom of expression and 
assembly but also took over social networks to eliminate criticism towards the government before 
the presidential elections. Politically motivated restrictions aimed to prohibit criticism and silence 
all those who voice up the issues through public expression (online and offline) as well as public 
demonstrations. Additionally, with the amendments, the police have been granted more power to 
administratively detain people who disobey them or organise and participate in an unauthorised 
protest. The amendments also affected the duration of administrative detentions related to the 
expression of dissent and established new penalties for organisation of unauthorized protests. For 
example, the penalty for unauthorized demonstration has been increased from 15 to 60 days; 
moreover disobeying the police will be sanctioned by 30 days detentions instead of 15. 
Additionally, the fines for participating in unsanctioned public gatherings increased drastically and 
reached to 7600 EUR from 955 (Azerbaijan 2013). The restrictions also concern the time and 
places of the demonstration. The law bans demonstrations near government buildings, highways, 
tunnels, bridges and places used by local government executives for public events; moreover, the 
protests are banned near military facilities, hospitals, and prisons. Additionally, “special places” 
for holding gatherings may be allocated by local authorities and time of assembly can be changed 
“if the limitation is necessary and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.” Interestingly, the 
law also limits assemblies on election days, or if the assemblies have political content (Civic 
Freedom Monitor: Azerbaijan 2019). In sum, with the prescriptive measures, the freedom of 
assembly and freedom of expression are fully restricted in Azerbaijan, especially if the gatherings 
have political intentions and mean to criticize the government. The civil society organisations and 
actors are generally deprived to exercise their freedom of expression and assembly which is 
guaranteed by international norms adopted by Azerbaijan.  
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The freedom of expression and assembly is highly restricted also in Belarus, where civil 
society is not able to freely participate in public demonstrations. Prior permission is required to 
hold protests and the local authorities very often arbitrarily reject the requests from the civil society 
organisations. The public protests are repressed with different means including detention and 
arrest by the police during the public demonstrations. Moreover, the participants of demonstrations 
are being punished with the fines, which came to substitute the detention and arrest; however, 
arrests and the use of force to disperse protests still exist. For example, in 2018, protests occurred 
against the opening of a restaurant near the site of mass executions back in the 1930s and the 
activists have been detained by law enforcement officials in plain clothes and kept under 
administrative arrest or fined (Freedom in the World: Belarus 2019). The law also restricts the 
dissemination of information about an assembly before approval from the government. Moreover, 
in order to eliminate public mobilisations around campaigns criticizing the government, a tendency 
of arresting activists has been observed to prevent planned assemblies. In case if the protest is 
permitted, in order to decrease participation of the wider public and minimize the visibility of 
dissent, the protests are often moved to less public places (CIVICUS Monitor 2019). Besides the 
prescriptive measures of repression on freedom of expression and assembly, reflexive measures 
are also used by Belarusian police namely the use of excessive force during mass demonstrations 
organised by the political opposition. The use of disproportionate force is also common during and 
after electoral campaigns. For example, over six hundred people have been arrested during the 
protests after the presidential elections in 2010. Arrest and detention of activists are also 
complemented with criminal responsibilities according to the Criminal Code on “Organization and 
Participation in Actions Rudely Violating Public Order.” With the justification of violation of public 
order, criminal responsibility is being placed on organisers and participants in mass events (Civic 
Freedom Monitor: Belarus 2019).  
Besides using the protection of public order as a justification for violation of freedom of 
expression and association, in Belarus, groups presenting interests of certain groups are 
prohibited from their rights with the justification of protecting family values. In 2017, the law on 
“Protecting Children from Information Harmful for their Health and Development” came into force, 
restricting spreading positive or neutral information about LGBT people as “discrediting the 
institution of the family” (Human Rights Watch 2017). 
In terms of legislation, the freedom of expression and assembly is generally respected in 
other EaP countries and prescriptive measures are less evident comparing to the reflexive 
measures of repressions, which are demonstrated mainly through using disproportionate force 
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during public gatherings. In Armenia, the violations of the right to freedom of assembly have long 
been a core problem of human rights, particularly relating to the use of force by law enforcement 
bodies. The most common tactics of repression during the protests have included the use of water 
cannons, tear gas, and baton charges, and in some cases live ammunition on unarmed protesters. 
Such attacks took place during most of the protests in the last decade, where people were 
seriously injured or killed. For example, in June 2015, during the “Electric Yerevan” social 
movement when protesters blockaded the streets with sit-ins, the police sprayed protesters with 
water cannons, and then marched forward to force them out; moreover police officers in plain 
clothes violently grabbed the protesters from the streets and dragged them behind the police line 
in order to prevent them to get to the streets again (Armenia 2015). Along with the violence towards 
peaceful protesters, arrest, and detention of activists who are in charge of leading the movements, 
is another tactic applied by police in Armenia. The detentions and arrests which last usually from 
a few hours to three days aim to spread fear among the protesters, hoping to repress the 
movements. In some cases, the activists have been cases arrested and charged with violation of 
public order and the use of force against the police. Additionally, administrative penalties have 
been placed on activists as a mechanism of financial repression (Ayvazyan 2018). Despite all the 
reflexive measures of repression on the protestors, in the case of Armenia, with an example of 
“Velvet Revolution” in 2018, where all the measures have been used to repress the movement, it 
can be claimed that the resistance and public mobilization confronted to the use of 
disproportionate force and help the civil society to fully use the civic space for political changes.  
In Georgia, the right to assembly is constitutionally protected and largely respected by the 
authorities. However, a new phenomenon of counterdemonstrations appeared, particularly 
creating hindrances for freedom of expression and assembly of minorities. For example, sexual 
minorities are not protected from violence. In 2013, authorized peaceful assembly on the 
International Day against Homophobia has been violently disrupted by a massive 
counterdemonstration of religious activists leading to clashes, as a result of which 28 people have 
been injured. Although measures have been taken to eliminate discrimination, adequate 
protection of LGBT activists during assemblies is still an issue (BTI: Georgia 2018).  
Besides counter-protests against minority groups, political activists have also been targeted 
by the authorities in Georgia. The authorities have been accused by the NGOs for restricting 
opposition access to the site of a planned Inauguration Day demonstration in December 2018 
which led to clashes and resulted in the detention of two supporters of the Georgian Dream and 
the opposition leader Davit Kirkitadze. The opposition leader was arrested after reportedly 
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assaulting a police officer; however, Kirkitadze’s supporters have claimed that the arrest is 
politically motivated. NGOs also stated police abused the administrative offences code to detain 
participants of peaceful assemblies (Georgia 2018). More questions have been raised over 
policing during the peaceful assemblies considering also the high profile arrest and violence 
against activist Irakli Kakabadze in 2015 for peacefully protesting (CIVICUS Monitor 2019).  
Similar to Georgia, the freedom of assembly in Moldova is largely respected; however, the 
parades and demonstrations of the LGBT community are always disrupted by aggressive 
counterdemonstrations organised by members of the Orthodox Church and conservative political 
parties. The law enforcement bodies usually are not able to ensure comprehensive protection of 
the participants of such events and consequently, the authorities relocate the demonstrations to 
be held in less public places (BTI Moldova 2018). 
In Ukraine, the same phenomenon can be observed. Recently, the government has been 
more tolerant of demonstrations; however the police still fail to ensure the security of protestors 
and eliminate clashes. Despite the protection of police during the LGBT Pride rally, ten people 
have been injured due to the attacks of right-wing activists to the participants of a peaceful 
assembly (CIVICUS Monitor 2019).  
The counterdemonstration against the minorities and the inability of the authorities to protect 
the rights of people show that the state still needs to improve the mechanisms of providing equal 
opportunity for everyone to enjoy their rights without any disruption. Relocating the assemblies to 
less public places and prohibition to hold assemblies in the city center as a protection mechanism 
cannot be valid as it affects the notion of the assembly and breaches enjoyment of freedom of 
expression. 
Another phenomenon, which is largely spread worldwide and exist also in the Eastern 
Partnership countries is the establishment of progovernment or government organised 
nongovernmental organisations (GONGOs), which are created to discredit the CSOs, attract 
international funding, get involved in election observations, and also are widely used to organise 
counterdemonstrations.  
A large sector of GONGOs has been created in Belarus, which not only gets state funding 
but also receives a significant amount of international aid. In addition to their immediate tasks, 
GONGOs are involved in the political process through election commissions and election 
observations (Nations in Transit 2017). In another case, the GONGOs have been served as a 
means to create a false image of public support of the government or certain politicians. The 
 20 
 
phenomenon has been widely observed in Armenia, where “fake” counterdemonstrations have 
been organised involving GONGOs to support the politicians, who are being accused of abusing 
the power for the sake of their businesses. In this way, the politicians try to show that the decisions 
made for themselves are also supported by the wider public (Ayvazyan 2018).  
Besides restrictions on the freedom of assembly and expression of certain groups or 
organisations, CSOs’ leaders, members, political activists, human rights defenders are also 
subject to repression in some EaP countries. Usually, repression involves violent attacks, 
detention, arrest, ill-treatment, and criminalisation.   
In Azerbaijan, usually, the CSO leaders are arrested under charges of illegal entrepreneurial 
activities, tax evasion and abuse of power or failure to register grants. Many political activists and 
human rights defenders have been arrested in recent years and are still imprisoned for their 
political activism. For example, in 2013, the chairman of the Election Monitoring and Democracy 
Studies Center, Anar Mammadli, has been charged with the justification of illegal 
entrepreneurship, tax evasion, abuse of power and failure to register grants. In 2014, Anar 
Mammadli has been sentenced to five and a half years as his appeals have been dismissed by 
the courts (Ismayil and Remezaite 2016, 26). Human Rights Watch reported about at least forty-
three human rights defenders, journalists, political and religious activists being wrongfully 
imprisoned as for 2018. Meanwhile, more activists have been detained and encountered 
harassment and prohibition of travel or have had to leave the country (Human Rights Watch: 
Azerbaijan 2018).  
The repressive practices on CSO leaders, political activists, and human rights defenders is 
also an existing trend in Belarus, where the activists are persecuted and held accountable for 
criminal offences due to their political or social activities, which challenge the authorities. In March 
2017, following the numerous protests against the Presidential Decree “On the prevention of social 
dependency” the government utilised repressive measure on the political opposition, civil society 
activists, bloggers, independent journalists, human rights activists, and ordinary citizens. 
Furthermore, administrative detention has been used against the opposition leaders, including the 
chairman of the United Civil Party Anatol Liabedzka, chairman of the movement “For Freedom” 
Yury Hubarevich and many more activists (Viasna 2017). In another case, a human rights 
defender Leanid Sudalenka’s office and home have been raided while he has been abroad for 
participating in a human rights conference. Eight computers have been seized under a criminal 
investigation on the transmission of pornography (Amnesty 2017, 15). 
 21 
 
In Armenia, recent years individual attacks on activists by unknown groups of people have 
been recorded, which have not been investigated properly and perpetrators are not announced 
due to the political notion of the attacks. For example, in 2013, a number of activists staging 
protests in Yerevan against corruption and President Serzh Sargsyan’s decision to join the 
Eurasian Union, have encountered violence, both by police and organised groups in the streets 
(Ketsemanian 2013). 
The attacks on individuals are not only addressed to political activists or CSO leaders but 
also targets the journalists and breaches freedom of media and freedom of expression. Attacks 
and detention of journalists is common practice also in some of the EaP countries. On the one 
hand, the journalists are being subject to violence during the protests, for example, in Armenia, at 
least ten journalists have suffered from burns, bruises, and other injuries after being hit by police 
stun grenades in Yerevan while covering a demonstration (Azatutyun 2016). On the other hand, 
the attacks and intimidation are applied for individual journalists, especially the ones who are 
critical about government or certain politicians. The CIVICUS Monitor reports that the violence and 
intimidation against journalists in Ukraine has been a huge issue after 2014 when the pro-Russian 
journalist Oles Buzina has been shot and other journalists have been detained due to their political 
views; moreover, many of them have been banned from entering the country. In another case, 
journalist Ruslan Kotsaba has been arrested after publishing a video on YouTube asking to 
boycott military mobilisation in Ukraine (CIVICUS Monitor 2016). 
The situation for journalists is extremely serious in Azerbaijan and Belarus, where journalists 
face routine harassment, including physical violence. Belarus is reported as the worst in Europe 
in terms of freedom of expression as the laws grant authorities with the power to arbitrarily block 
websites and interfere with the websites of several local human rights groups. In the case of 
Azerbaijan, attacks, detentions and extrajudicial killings of journalists and bloggers have been 
reported. As for 2015, eight journalists have been imprisoned and at least five journalists and 
bloggers have been murdered since 1992. The independent media has been constrained and 
news outlets have been a crackdown by the authorities systematically (CIVICUS Monitor 2016). 
With the attacks on journalists, bloggers, civil society actors, the authorities also tend to 
shrink the digital space, which is being used in recent years to mobilise people and spread 
information for the wider public. By making it difficult or even illegal for individuals and groups to 
gather or meet to exercise their right to freedom of assembly, freedom of expression (both online 
and offline) the authorities with prescriptive and reflexive measures of repression directly hinder 
the abilities of CSOs to plan or engage in advocacy activities.  
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Conclusions 
The research aimed to analyse the magnitude of impact of the civil society score in the 
overall democracy index and define a new methodology for calculation of shrinking space growth 
index in the Eastern Partnership countries as well as identify repressive measures imposed on 
civil society organizations, journalists, activists.  
The linear regression of the democracy score and civil society score shows that despite 
the fact the civil society score has the least magnitude of impact on overall democracy index 
comparing to the other categories of index, it still has a significant impact as even in case of slight 
changes in the civil society score the democracy index will change significantly resulting in a 
change in regime type. This comes to prove that the level of democracy depends on the level of 
development of civil society. 
The analysis of the Freedom House’s Democracy Index showed that the civil society has 
a significant impact on the level of democracy and enjoyment of political rights and civil liberties 
of individuals in the Eastern Partnership countries, despite the different level of democratisation, 
shrinking space issue exist in all countries. In the case of the Eastern Partnership countries, 
analysis of the EaP Index data for 2015–2016 and 2017 with the newly developed index reveals 
that Shrinking Space Growth Index has increased in relatively democratic countries namely 
Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, whereas Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus have recorded slight 
improvements since 2015. This does not mean that the civic space is more expanded in the 
countries with low democracy score rather this shows that over the years there has been 
improvements and deteriorations in the shrinking space score and Azerbaijan and Belarus still 
remain leaders in repressing civil society.  
As the analysis showed, as in the other repressive countries, in the EaP countries as well, 
usually governments repress civil society using law enforcement bodies and laws, 
administrative regulations, and policies. As the level of democracy and civil society 
development, repressive measures issued also varies from country to country. The research 
proved the hypothesis that democracy level is linked to the type of measures used to repress civil 
society. Consequently, in more authoritarian countries such as Azerbaijan and Belarus, there is a 
trend of using prescriptive measures and the repressions are “legally” justified, whereas in 
Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine in terms of the regulations the rights are guaranteed; 
however reflexive measures are being practical for the repression on civil society in recent years. 
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Annexes  
Annex 1. Outputs of Simple Linear Regression for All Indicators of Democracy 
Score. 
 
Dependent Variable:   Democracy_Score_Without_NDG 
Equation 
Model Summary Parameter Estimates 
R Square F df1 df2 Sig. Constant b1 
Linear ,972 136,942 1 4 ,000 -5,169 1,732 
The independent variable is NDG. 
 
Dependent Variable:   Democracy_Score_without_IM 
Equation 
Model Summary Parameter Estimates 
R Square F df1 df2 Sig. Constant b1 
Linear ,966 113,631 1 4 ,000 1,206 ,796 
The independent variable is IM. 
 
Dependent Variable:   Democracy_Score_without_JFI 
Equation 
Model Summary Parameter Estimates 
R Square F df1 df2 Sig. Constant b1 
Linear ,915 42,976 1 4 ,003 -1,979 1,297 
The independent variable is JFI. 
 
Dependent Variable:   Democracy_Score_without_CO 
Equation 
Model Summary Parameter Estimates 
R Square F df1 df2 Sig. Constant b1 
Linear ,442 3,173 1 4 ,149 ,411 ,877 
The independent variable is CO. 
 
Dependent Variable:   Democrcy_Score_without_LDG 
Equation 
Model Summary Parameter Estimates 
R Square F df1 df2 Sig. Constant b1 
Linear ,871 27,086 1 4 ,006 -1,917 1,290 
The independent variable is LDG. 
 
 
Dependent Variable:   Democracy_Score_without_EP 
Equation 
Model Summary Parameter Estimates 
R Square F df1 df2 Sig. Constant b1 
Linear ,798 15,778 1 4 ,017 2,588 ,565 
The independent variable is EP. 
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Annex 2. Scores of Five Subcategories of Deep and Sustainable Democracy of EaP 
Index. 
 
 
 
     Years Freedom of 
Speech and 
Assembly 
Human 
Rights, 
Protection 
against 
Torture 
Democratic 
Rights and 
Elections 
Independent 
Media 
 
Equal 
opportunities 
and non-
discrimination 
Armenia  
2017 0,47 0,58 0,48 0,55 0,48 
2015-2016 0,46 0,64 0,43 0,53 0,47 
Azerbaijan  
2017 0 0,36 0,16 0,13 0,44 
2015-2016 0 0,33 0,06 0,23 0,41 
Belarus  
2017 0,1 0,06 0,18 0,21 0,25 
2015-2016 0 0,05 0,15 0,22 0,31 
Georgia  
2017 0,73 0,68 0,7 0,62 0,64 
2015-2016 0,72 0,72 0,68 0,69 0,68 
Moldova  
2017 0,72 0,64 0,61 0,61 0,68 
2015-2016 0,7 0,7 0,72 0,64 0,79 
Ukraine  
2017 0,83 0,65 0,7 0,57 0,75 
2015-2016 0,85 0,77 0,59 0,63 0,75 
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